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Abstract 
Compared with the rest of the European countries the weight of the house property 
market in Spain is very high, which is consistent with the weakness of the tenancy market. 
In this context, it has often been argued that an inefficient judicial system, implying a 
cumbersome procedure to evict a non-paying tenant or simply needing a long period 
to execute a decision, may be an important determinant of the tenancy market weakness, 
as it constrains the effective supply by reducing the profitability of landlords. This research 
has studied this effect econometrically using a panel data approach and exploiting the 
differences in the judicial efficiency that exists among the Spanish provinces. After controlling 
for several other factors, this study concludes that the degree of inefficiency of the judicial 
system has a positive, although minor, impact on the differences in the property share 
among provinces in Spain. 
JEL Classification: K40, R21 
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1 Introduction 
Since the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) the weight of the house property market has been 
increasing persistently in Spain. Although the official statistical information available is very 
scarce, using the census database it is known that the proportion rose from 63.4% to 82.2% 
between 1970 and 2001. Moreover, following the estimations of the Spanish Ministry 
of Housing (2008) the average property rate rose in a further 2.1 percentage points in the 
period 2001-2007. 
Several factors may have affected the evolution of the property share in Spain 
over the last decades. Among those are the interest rates that have fallen down [Blanco and 
Restoy (2007)] especially after 1995, the liberalization of the banking sector since 1980 
that may have played an indirect role [Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas (2004), Iacoviello and 
Minetti (2003)], the tenancy laws that have become more stringent after the II World War 
[Mora (2008)], or the favorable fiscal regime of buying versus renting [López García (1996), 
García-Vaquero and Martínez (2005)]. 
Several studies have pointed out that the factors mentioned above are not exclusive 
of Spain and that the increase in the property rate can be found in several other markets of 
the European Union and also in the United States [Louvot-Runavot (2001)]. Nonetheless, the 
weakness of the tenancy market as compared to the property market is somehow 
exceptional in Spain. This situation is generally regarded as undesirable for several economic 
reasons. The most important one is perhaps that a weak tenancy market is related to lower 
mobility of persons and workers [Maclennan et al. (1998) and Barceló (2006)] which tend to 
increase the unemployment rate [Layard et al. (1991)] and to reduce the efficiency of the 
economy [Hardman and Ionnides (1999)]. More recently, Arce and Lopez-Salido (2007) 
stressed how a well developed house renting sector can be a crucial device to avoid 
housing prices bubbles and an excessive concentration of resources in the building sector. 
As a result of these concerns, and especially during the housing boom experienced in Spain 
in the last decade, the Spanish authorities have paid systematic attention to the problems of 
the housing market. 
In this context a new Law was passed in December 2009 introducing new regulatory 
measures aiming to protect the owners of rented dwellings.1 These reforms were directed to 
improve the functioning of the tenancy market, and thus, to reduce the weight of the property 
market. Those measures included, on one hand, a reform of the Spanish “Civil Procedural 
Law” (CPL, Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil2) in order to speed up evictions and the collection 
of rents by the owners and, on the other hand, a reform of the Spanish Tenancy Law 
(Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos3) giving the owner more legal grounds to shorten up the 
term of the tenancy contract. 
Underlying those measures is the idea that both a slow judicial system (implying a 
cumbersome procedure to evict a non-paying tenant or simply a lengthy period to execute 
a decision) and too strict rules governing the tenancy contracts (such as rules limiting the 
                                                                          
1. Law 19/2009 of November 23rd (de medidas de fomento y agilización procesal del alquiler y de la eficiencia 
energética de los edificios). 
2. Law 1/2000, of January 7th (Civil Procedural Law). 
3. Law 29/1994, of November 24th. 
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possibilities of the landlord to recover the flat for his own use) have been detrimental for the 
tenancy market as they reduce the effective supply and may have contributed to reduce 
the share of rented dwellings. That is the result found, in a general (international) basis by 
some papers in the economic literature. For instance, Djankov et al. (2003) proposed 
a measure of formalism of the judicial system when evicting a non-paying tenant. They 
concluded that higher formalism is related to more difficult evictions and higher 
unpredictability of the procedures.4 Casas-Arce and Saiz (2006) used the measure of 
Djankov et al. (2003) to explain the decision between owning and renting in a set of countries. 
They found that more formalism is expected to reduce the weight of the tenancy market 
although their conclusions are directed to an international analysis. 
Organization and objectives of this research 
This paper aims to analyze the impact of an inefficient judicial system in Spain on the housing 
tenure outcomes. In order to do that, I exploit the cross-province variation existing in the 
weight of the house property market in Spain and in the performance of the judicial 
system when it solves tenancy conflicts (and when it executes decisions). Landlords are 
supposed to quit the tenancy market when they are opposed to an environment in which 
it is very difficult to enforce tenancy contracts. Thus, the present research aims to assess to 
what extent the efficiency of the functioning of the judicial system explains the variation 
of the weights of the property market in the Spanish provinces. 
In order to do that I have constructed an index of judicial efficiency for each Spanish 
province based on official judicial data.5 Then, its impact in the property share is estimated 
after controlling for a set of other relevant economic and demographic factors. 
The overall organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a descriptive 
analysis of the cross province variation of the property rate in Spain and constructs the judicial 
efficiency indicator used in the main estimations. Section 3 explores the empirical literature 
that discusses how to model the housing tenure decisions. It also presents the variables 
used in this research. Section 4 presents the estimations using panel data techniques. 
Finally, section 5 offers the conclusions of this study. Two annexes complete the paper. 
Annex A presents alternative estimations when other judicial efficiency measures are taken 
into account. Annex B explores theoretically the hypothesis tested in this paper. 
                                                                          
4. The results and methodology by Djankov et al. (2003), although very relevant, cannot be used in the experiment that is 
proposed in this paper because, as it was said, they work on an international level and for a specific year. Therefore, 
they cannot capture the variability in the efficiency within a specific country. The latter may be caused by differences 
in the application of the Civil Procedural Law and not by the Civil Procedural Law by itself [see Mora (2009) for a 
discussion on the topic]. 
5. Other indices are also constructed and tested in the annex A of this paper. 
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2 Measuring the judicial efficiency and the property rate in the Spanish economy 
The owner who wants to collect an unpaid rent or wants to evict a tenant for whatever 
reason (non-payment, vandalism) in Spain has to use the procedures set up by the CPL.6 
This paper is interested on measuring the efficiency of the judicial system when dealing 
with those procedures (specifically applied to the tenancy market conflicts). 
The CPL is the basic procedural regulation of the judicial system. It establishes the 
rules of access to the court system, the formalisms that the parties must observe, the role of 
the judge, the rules governing evidence, the control by superior instances and all related 
issues. Therefore that Law is a main determinant of the “aggregated” slow (or fast) 
performance of the judicial system in Spain. Although it is a national-wide Law, its application 
differs among Spanish provinces. A reasonable explanation for that is that the workload of the 
judges may be different among the provinces and that the resources invested in the justice 
Administration differ at least at a region7 level. However, courts are not specialized in Spain 
and therefore no information exists on the means invested by type of conflict. In any case, it is 
possible to observe that the efficiency of the judicial system diverges among the different 
provinces of Spain over time so that a panel with information on the functioning of the judicial 
system could be constructed. It is reasonable to expect that in the most inefficient provinces, 
in which it is more difficult to evict a non-paying tenant or it is more difficult to have the rent 
paid through the judicial system, landlords will opt to quit the tenancy market (and thus the 
share of tenancy in the province will diminish). 
For tackling this problem, a relevant question arises: What are the specific 
procedures needed for recovering an unpaid rent (by a tenant) in Spain? The Civil Procedural 
Law (2000) establishes a specific procedure for recovering such a debt: first, a “declaratory 
judgment” will “declare” the existence of the debt and will declare the obligation of the debtor 
to pay. We can call that “first stage” or “first procedure” because there is still the possibility 
that the tenant decides not to pay the debt. In such a case, a final or definitive, procedure 
(“executory process”) takes place. In the “executory” stage the creditor asks the judge to 
“execute” the debt. As a result of this final procedure, the judge will seize the amount from 
the bank accounts of the debtor and probably will evict him from the dwelling. 
The General Council of the Judicial Power (Consejo General del Poder Judicial, 
CGPJ) has published a database reporting the number of cases filed, solved and still pending 
in the Spanish judicial system by subject, region, court8 and year. From that database a 
relative measure of efficiency can be constructed for the enforcement of each procedure: 
the congestion rate (see equation 1 below). The congestion rate is defined as the ratio 
between the sum of pending cases (measured at the beginning of the period) plus new 
cases in a specific year and the cases resolved in that same year [Padilla et al. (2007)]. 
A lower congestion rate is related to greater efficiency of the judicial system. Two alternative 
                                                                          
6. It must be noted that some extrajudicial solutions may be found by the parties, as sending the case to arbitration. 
However, only a judge can execute an eviction in Spain. 
7. The “Comunidades Autónomas” (regions) have some powers related to the administration of justice in Spain. 
Even though the “judicial power” is not propertly transferred to the regions, the management of the means of the “judicial 
power” is influenced by the policies developed by the regions. For instance, they decide how much money is invested 
in new courts each year in their territories, even though the new courts are integrated in a system that is centrally 
governed. 
8. The “courts” analyzed in this study are the “juzgados de primera instancia” and the “juzgados de primera instancia 
e instrucción”.  Those are the courts available for the parties at the “entry level”. 
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measures of efficiency (the resolution rate and the pending cases rate) are explained and 










  (1) 
 
The CGPJ offers homogeneous data for the different procedures for the period 
2001-2007.9 The prefix “prt” precedes the efficiency measure related to procedures in the 
“declaratory stage” (or as we called it, “first” procedure): prtcongestion. The prefix “ex” 
precedes the efficiency measure related to the executions: excongestion. Table 1 shows the 
descriptive statistics for those computations (also for the alternative efficiency measures 
studied in the annex A). Table 2 shows the results for the congestion rate when studied 
for the executions (excongestion) in the period 2001-2007.10 
An average congestion rate of 3.97 over the period 2001-2007 (see table 1) 
indicates that around four cases (summing up the pending cases and the new cases 
arriving to the courts in a specific year) were waiting to be solved when the courts were able 
to solve just one. In the worst case, this amount was almost 10. As it can be seen, there was, 
on average, a difference of 5.98 congestion points between the most efficient and the least 
efficient province throughout the period. 
Graph 1 represents this quotient for the years 2001 and 2007. A decrease in the 
efficiency of the system can be observed throughout the period. Looking at the graph 
it can also be seen that no specific provincial pattern seems to show up in the reduction of 
the efficiency of the judicial system. However, the Basque Country has a better performance 
all over the period. 
What was the evolution of the property rate during this period (2001-2007)? The 
proportion of property among the total number of principal dwellings in Spain (called “Prprop” 
in the tables) is in fact chosen as dependent variable in this research. That proportion is 
the aggregate counterpart of the individual housing tenure decision. The data are obtained 
from the Spanish Ministry of Housing (2009) and are available for the period 2001-2007 for 50 
Spanish provinces (then, excluding Ceuta and Melilla).11 This classification divides the 
principal houses in three groups: dwellings in the property market, dwellings in the tenancy 
market, and “transferred dwellings” (cessions or non-lucrative use of the houses). On average, 
in 2007, 88.2% of the dwellings were in the property market, 9.8% were in the tenancy 
market and 1.9% were “transferred houses” (cessions). Table 3 shows the descriptive 
statistics of this variable. 
On average the share of property in the Spanish economy is very high (with a mean 
of 88.6% over the whole period) although some strong differences can still be found 
among provinces (share below 80% in the Balearic Islands, Las Palmas, Girona or Barcelona 
in several years and above 94% in Lugo, Soria or Castellón at the end of the period). 
                                                                          
9. Note that the new CPL (2000) entered into force on 7th of January of 2001. This new CPL changed radically several 
aspects of the civil procedures in Spain [Mora (2009)] and therefore it is not advisable to relate the data after 2001 with 
previous observations in this specific research. 
10. Excluding Ceuta and Melilla (no information is available for them). 
11. Note that the data is provided in November of each year and not in January. That fact is taken into account 
in the estimations. 
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Thus, there is some ground to explain and exploit inter-provincial differences. Table 4 
presents the property shares between 2001 and 2007. 
Moreover, some strong dynamics can be found at a provincial level. The province 
with the highest proportion of property in 2007 was 3.9% higher than the equivalent in 2001. 
More importantly it is to note that during this period there is a difference of at least 14% 
between the province with a higher proportion of property and that with the smaller one. 
Thus, some local factors may be affecting the provincial markets that are different from those 
that can be identified at an aggregate level. 
Graph 2 represents the average congestion rate (and also the resolution rate and the 
pending cases rate as defined in annex A) over the period 2001 and 2007. The graph 
confirms the reduction in efficiency already seen in the maps. The graph also represents the 
average property rate in the same period. As it can be seen in this graph, a reduction in 
the efficiency of the judicial system when solving tenancy conflicts (by an increase in the 
congestion rate) took place at the same time that the property rate was increasing. 
The aim of this paper is to test econometrically (taking into account all the usual 
controls analyzed and identified in the literature) if there exist any significant relation 
between an increasing rate of inefficiency in the judicial system (when dealing with the 
conflicts related to the tenancy market) and the observed increase in the property share in 
the period analyzed. An increase in that proportion is expected if, ceteris paribus, the judicial 
system becomes more inefficient when solving conflicts affecting the rental market (that is, 
if renting becomes more “problematic”). 
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3 Modeling the effects of institutions on the housing tenure outcomes 
Empirical literature review 
Several economic studies point out that a wide group of socio-economic factors (economic, 
demographic or social determinants) affect the decision of buying or renting a dwelling 
(from the point of view of a potential tenant or a potential buyer) or the decision of putting a 
property in the rental market (from the point of view of the potential landlord). Among them 
it can be included the permanent income of individuals, the relative price of buying versus 
renting (or the user cost), financial restrictions, taxation and some demographic variables.12 
Although all the determinants affecting one side of the market will have an effect 
in the equilibrium share of property or tenancy of the economy (and thus would be 
affecting indirectly both sides in any moment), some studies split those factors as mainly 
“demand factors” or “supply” factors (affecting more directly the decisions of landlords). 
Other determinants, as prices would affect both sides of the contracts at the same time and 
should be treated as endogenous. 
This subsection aims to provide a very partial survey of both the empirical literature 
and the most studied variables affecting the housing tenure choice. Special attention is paid 
to the “demand” or “supply” considerations if they were analyzed. 
First of all, several works discussed the effect of pure demographic factors such as 
the proportion of young population or the proportion of married couples on the share 
of property of the economy (as an outcome of the housing tenure choice) [see Jaffe and 
Rosen (1979) or Green (1995)]. We would expect that the tenancy rate is positively 
related to the proportion of young population but negatively related to an increase in the 
share of married couples. Following the same references, those factors are usually identified 
as “demand” factors. In fact, the age of a landlord has not been a point of discussion in the 
same research. 
In turn, another demographic factor, the population density, would be affecting 
mainly the landlord decisions (the supply side) and not the tenant side. Linneman (1986) 
argues that landlords face reduced costs of monitoring and higher efficiency in supplying 
housing services in the case of highly populated towns. Thus, we would expect to find a 
negative relation between homeownership and population density coming from the landlords 
side [also Fisher and Jaffe (2003)]. 
The effect of wealth in the house tenure decision is also widely studied in the 
literature [De Leeuw and Ekanem (1971), Haurin et al. (1996)]. In several studies it is found 
that, among other factors, the homeownership rate is positively related to GDP per capita 
or similar income measures (reducing the demand for tenancy), although that relation is not 
always significant [Fisher and Jaffe (2003)].13 
                                                                          
12. Other factors cited in the introduction, such as the tenancy Laws are not studied in the rest of this work as they 
will not introduce any interregional variation to exploit in the estimations. 
13. Theoretically it could even have the opposite sign (Henderson and Ioannides, 1983). See the discussion in the 
annex B. 
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Credit constraints and financial capacity are also determinants of the tenancy or 
property share observed in the economy. They affect mainly the tenant/buyer side as the 
financial constraint will prevent some tenants to buy a property [Jaffe and Rosen (1979), 
Hargreaves (2003), Lauridsen and Skak (2007), and Mayordomo (2008)]. In fact, this effect 
may be coincident with the age, as younger individuals may face higher constraints because 
their actual income is much lower than their future earnings [Lafayette et al. (1995)]. 
Finally, the price of renting versus buying affects both sides of the contracts. To put it 
another way, it can be understood as the outcome of the contracts in the market. In any 
case, the higher the price of buying (with respect to the price of renting a dwelling), the higher 
the number of individuals opting for renting a house. The opposite argument would hold 
for the other side of the contract (the landlord/seller). The measure of “prices” takes very 
different forms in the literature: in some cases some works have estimated the effect of rental 
prices [Jaffe and Rosen (1979)], while others opt for relative measures. For instance, 
Hendershott and Shilling (1980) studied the effect of the relative cost of owner-occupied 
dwellings and the rental prices. In turn, Rodríguez and Barrios (2004) and Barrios and 
Rodríguez (2004) calculated a user cost taking into account both the price of buying and the 
price of renting and some fiscal issues related to them. Several types of public intervention 
such as the fiscal incentives or the provision of public housing may play also a significant role 
[Rosen (1979), Rosen and Rosen (1980), and Lauridsen and Skak (2007)]. 
Thus, in general, while the demand of housing services is directly driven by a group 
of heterogenous factors ranging from demography to wealth, the supply side (landlords 
and sellers) is mainly affected by the interaction with costs, frictions and prices (derived from 
some heterogenous factors as the user cost of the properties, the actual relative prices 
of selling versus renting, the population density or the regulatory measures introduced 
by the tenancy laws). If more frictions are suffered in the tenancy market some landlords will 
decide to quit the tenancy market. 
In this context, one extra “cost” that a landlord face and that is not studied in the 
previous literature is the “judicial inefficiency”. The landlord, who cannot enforce a tenancy 
contract because the judicial system is slow or costly enforcing those contracts, will loose 
part of the flow of rents or will loose part of the value of his property.  Thus, an owner may 
decide not to put his dwelling into the tenancy market affecting with his decision the share of 
property and tenancy observed in equilibrium. This argument is also discussed theoretically 
in the annex B. 
The judicial efficiency can be considered then, as an exogenous variable affecting the 
equilibrium price (together with the quantity of housing services in the market) affecting 
the equilibrium through movements in the supply curve (the theoretical framework explained 
in annex B can be used to rationalize this argument). Therefore, in an econometric 
implementation the price should be treated as endogenous and thus it must be instrumented 
with demand factors (see next subsection). For instance, an exogenous shock increasing the 
judicial inefficiency will affect the equilibrium price and quantity of housing services through 
a shift in the supply side (or investment) of housing services but not through the “demand 
curve”. Thus, it will be necessary to instrument the price (or the user cost) using strictly 
“demand” instruments (that is, demand shifters which are not affecting the supply). 
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Empirical strategy 
As it was already introduced, the objective of this research is to offer estimations of the 
effect of the inefficiency of the judicial system on the proportion of property in the economy. 
The judicial inefficiency can be understood as an extra cost that landlords face when they 
rent their properties in the market. Therefore, I propose to estimate a supply curve. 
As it was discussed before, the “price” (taking the form of a relative rent or a user 
cost) will be an endogenous variable as we face a simultaneity problem. That is, the price 
and quantity are jointly determined by the demand and supply curves of the market. Thus, 
as my objective is to estimate a supply curve I will instrument the price using several demand 
shifters (proportion of young renters, wealth, credit availability and the proportion of social 
housing) (see subsection 3.4). 
The following general model is proposed (equation 2). 
Share of property in the province i,t = c + ctTt  + 1 “Price” i,t +  2 Judicial 
 inefficiencyi,t +  3 Densityi,t  + (i + i,t ) (2) 
 
Measuring 2 is the focus of this research. We also expect that the population 
density is negatively related to the property share. The “price” will take the form of a user cost 
or a relative price and will affect both landlords and tenants. As I aim to estimate a supply 
curve, the price should enter the equation with a positive sign. Other controls such as regional 
effects and time effects will be included. 
Variables in the supply curve 
Apart from the proportion of housing in the property (or the tenancy) market and the judicial 
efficiency measure, a supply curve should include also a measure of the price of buying 
(versus renting) or an approximation of the user cost and, following the literature, a measure 
of the population density. 
PRICE AND USER COST 
In the main estimations I will include a measure of “user cost” (Usercost) as independent 
variable (it will be treated as an endogenous variable in the estimations). The user cost is 





)(cos    (3) 
 
In (3) PViv is the price of the squared meter of the average house in the province 
(obtained from the official accounts of the Ministry of Housing) and PRent is the rent paid 
for renting a squared meter in the average dwelling offered for renting in the province. 
The Ministry of Housing of Spain provides the average rent just for 2006 so the series have 
been enlarged following the evolution of the component of the consumer price index that 
captures the evolution of the rents. The resulting variable is defined for the period 2001-2007. 
“i” is the interest rate14 that changes across time but no across provinces (see table 5). 
                                                                          
14. Interest rate on lending for house purchase. 
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Finally, I also add a house depreciation rate “δ” of 2%.15 Finally ΔPViv stands for the inter-
annual increase in the housing price. 
“Price to rent” is a variable constructed as the quotient of the price of the 
squared meter of the average house in the province and the rent paid for renting a squared 
meter in the average dwelling offered for renting in the province. As before, the variable is 
defined for the period 2001-2007. 
POPULATION DENSITY 
As it was already discussed, it also seems advisable to control the results by the population 
density (“density”) of the province as a way to control for the diversity of provinces in Spain 
and for the “efficiency” of landlords [Linneman (1986)]. Related to that, previous works 
have found a reduced share of property in areas with higher urban population [Fisher and 
Jaffe (2003)]. The population distribution in Spain differs greatly among the provinces. On the 
one hand the population in Spain is concentrated in the coastal provinces (Barcelona, 
Valencia, Málaga, etc). On the other hand, some provinces inland are quite low populated 
and have not attracted much of the new immigrants (Soria, Teruel, etc). See table 3 for some 
summary statistics. 
“Demand shifters” and other controls 
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
This work proposes to instrument the “price” by the following “demographic” variables: the 
proportion of “young” population in the Spanish provinces (ppob2039) defined as the ratio of 
the population that is 20 to 39 years old and that it is expected to have a higher proportion 
of tenancy than other population groups (although, at the same time, it is the group that 
applies more actively for mortgages) [Rodríguez and Barrios (2004)], the rate of nuptiality 
in the province, as it can influence the decision of buying a house (nuptiality) and the 
proportion of foreign population living in the province (foreign) because immigrants may be 
inclined towards renting as a result of their higher mobility. These variables are obtained 
from the official municipal population accounts (Padrón Municipal, INE). However, in the final 
estimations, the rate of nuptiality and the share of foreign population are not included as they 
do not have any significant impact in the relation. 
“FINANCIAL” VARIABLES 
Probably the most important controls to include in this study are those that can be grouped 
as “financial” variables: a measure of income per capita and two measures of easiness of 
access to credit and financial services (bankarization of the province and credit constraint). 
Both of them were studied theoretically by Henderson and Ioannides (1983) (annex B). 
“ln GDPpc” represent the logarithm of the current GDP per capita once corrected 
by provincial purchasing power parities (PPPs). The source of the raw data is the regional 
accounts of the National Statistics Institute (INE). The information on provincial PPPs is 
obtained from Alcaide Inchausti et al. (2004) and Alcaide Inchausti and Alcaide Guindo (2008). 
Higher income is related in the literature with a higher weight of the property markets. 
                                                                          
15. Following the Spanish Census of 2001, 2% of the buildings were in poor condition. I opt to use that percentage, 
although other sources point to higher rates: Naredo et al. (2005) propose a rate of house demolition of 0,397%, 
the American Housing Survey arrives to a rate of 0,295 and in the case of France the rate would be 0,25. 
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The rate of temporary employment, that is another typical macro variable, showed up to be 
non significant in this study.16 
An increased access to financial services may also make available more credit to 
the individuals, and therefore may increase the share of property in the province. No direct 
measures of “financial” or “credit constrained” families is available for the Spanish economy 
for the whole period. Just some surveys provide that information for very specific years. 
Thus, it is necessary to construct alternative variables providing similar information for all the 
period under analysis. Two variables are proposed in this study: a measure of “bankarization” 
and an ad hoc measure of credit constraint (“credit”) (see below). 
“Bankarization”, that could be understood as a proxy for banking competition, 
is a variable constructed as the quotient of the number of banks, savings banks and other 
financial offices in a specific province and the population of the province in the specific year. 
The hypothesis could be that if more banks compete in the province more credit could be 
available. This variable does not have significant effects on the share of property. 
Finally, it would be interesting to control for a variable of “credit constraint”. As it was 
already discussed, no specific variable is available at a provincial level in Spain for all the years 
of study. Thus, this study captures that concept through at ad hoc variable called “credit”. 
“credit” would be the residual (μi,t) of the following estimation (see equation 4): 
 
Number of Mortgages i,t = c +  1 GDPpc i,t +  2 ppob2039 i,t +  3 Coast i,t +μ i,t (4) 
 
The residual of the regression (4) will assign a positive sign to the provinces and 
years in which the number of mortgages given to the families (obtained from the statistics of 
the National Statistics Institute and the Banco de España-Eurosystem) is still positive 
(on average) after controlling for its wealth (GDP per capita, with the same source as before), 
its population (taken as young population as defined before) and a dummy variable (“coast”) 
taking value 1 for the Mediterranean and Andalusian coastal provinces plus the Balearic 
islands and the Canary islands).17 It seems necessary to control for the variable “coast” as 
those provinces are a typical destination of tourism and foreign real-estate investments 
and that would be influencing the number of mortgages observed in the statistics. Note that 
the dependent variable of regression (4) is the number of mortgages and not the quantity 
of those mortgages (although that information is also available). That seems better because 
taking the quantity of the mortgages would bias the estimations in favour of provinces 
such as Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, San Sebastian etc. in which the prices of housing 
are much higher than in the rest of Spain. 
Thus, this variable ideally captures unexpected easiness of credit after controlling 
for the most typical and expected factors of concession of mortgages. Therefore it would be 
                                                                          
16. Obtained from the EPA micro-data. 
17. “Coast” takes value 1 for the following provinces: Girona, Barcelona, Tarragona, Castellón, Valencia, Alicante, 
Murcia, Almería, Granada, Málaga, Sevilla, Cádiz, Balearic Islands and Canary Islands (provinces of Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife and Las Palmas). 
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taken as a proxy for the inverse of credit constraint.18 Table 3 presents some summary 
statistics of the variables already discussed. 
PUBLIC SUPPORT, RULE OF LAW AND OTHER VARIABLES 
An issue that may add some variation among the Spanish provinces is the differential 
“government support” [see among others, Atterhög (2005)] of renting or buying in the different 
regions or provinces of Spain. The provinces have no power to pass specific tax deductions 
for renting or buying a dwelling, although the regions (Comunidades Autónomas) do have that 
power.19 Table 6 presents the evidence of regional tax deductions applied to home ownership 
(O) or tenancy (T) in the period 2002-2007.20 It also highlights that the Basque Country and 
Navarre have a special (foral, F) tax system. It must be noted that no one of the deductions 
applicable in the rest of regions are “general deductions” because they apply to very specific 
population groups (young residents, handicapped citizens, etc.) or to special circumstances 
(for instance small towns in risk of population loss). 
As a result, it would be advisable to take into account the different taxing systems 
in the Basque Country and Navarre. However, note that as long as we are going to estimate 
the model using fixed effects or first differences (see section 4) a dummy variable, “basque”, 
taking value 1 for the three Basque provinces (Alava, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya) will be dropped 
in any case because of collinearity.21 With respect to the rest of deductions, it does not seem 
advisable to construct variables to capture all those effects for the following reasons (taking 
into account the small number of observations available for this research): most of them apply 
to young population, thus their effect is captured by the proportion of young population in the 
Spanish provinces, ppob2039, that will be taken into account in the estimations. With respect 
to other deductions applicable for even more specific circumstances (handicapped citizens, 
targeted towns), their scope is too limited to be taken into account in this setup. 
A final relevant question would be this: Are there other main interventions in the 
housing market in Spain? Spain has some strong instruments of intervention, such as a 
general house ownership deduction, a National Housing Plan and a Tenancy Law affecting 
the rules of the tenancy contracts. The Tenancy Law is the same for all the country and thus 
is not taken into account in this research. However, as result of the Housing plans, the 
number of social houses constructed in the provinces may differ.  I take into account its effect 
in the market through the variable “shousing” that is defined as the proportion of social 
housing (houses sold or rented at prices below market price by the public administration) 
over the total number of houses in the specific year and province. 
Other studies [Gwin and Ong (2004)] argue that the approach to the “rule of Law” 
may be different in different countries and that can influence the housing market. In the case 
of this research it can be argued that no significant variations in the “rule of Law” exist among 
the different provinces of a single country like Spain. Moreover, the relevant information 
about the “rule of Law” (if we can capture it as “delinquency” in the tenancy market) is already 
captured by the judicial system ratios. 
                                                                          
18. The residual takes positive values in all the years for the following provinces: A Coruña, Alicante, Asturias, Badajoz, 
Barcelona, Cáceres, Córdoba, Jaén, León, Madrid, Málaga, Ourense, Sevilla, Valencia and Toledo. 
19. Local taxes (as the IBI, “impuesto de bienes inmuebles”) are not taken into account although they could add some 
variation. 
20. Law 21/2001 of December 27th established that the regions (Comunidades Autónomas) have the possibility 
to pass new deductions on the basis of personal or family circumstances or non-entrepreneurial investments. 
21. No dummy for Navarre is included in the panel data regressions as its differential effect must be captured 
by the fixed effects. Please note that Navarre is a province and a region at the same time. 
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4 Estimation and results 
Following the variables discussed in section 3, the subsequent model (equation 5) will be 
estimated following two-step (instrumental variables) generalized method of moments 
(GMM estimation) [Wooldridge (2001), Arellano (2002), Baum et al. (2003)].22 
Two sets of results are provided to take into account two different ways to transform 
the data: on the one hand table 7 provides the results when we include fixed effects (FE). 
On the other hand, table 8 provides the results when we take “first differences” (FD). In both 
cases I present standard errors robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
 
Prprop i,t = c + ∑ctTt  + 1 Usercost i,t +  2 Excongestion i,t-3+  3 Densityi,t+ (i + i,t ) (5) 
 
In equation (5) the dependent variable is the proportion of property in the province. 
As independent variables I include mainly “supply” factors: the rate of efficiency of the judicial 
system and density. Time dummies are included to take into account the cycle. Wald tests 
of significance for those time dummies are reported in the tables. 
As it was already discussed, the user cost approximates the relation between the 
price to buy and the price to rent. Those prices are present in the decisions of both tenants 
and landlords and therefore connect both sides of the market. Thus, in this kind of 
“simultaneity”, the user cost will be instrumented. 
As instruments I choose a set of variables affecting directly the demand side of the 
market: the proportion of young population in the province, ppob2039 and its lagged value, 
the proxy to credit constraint, credit and its lagged value, the lagged value of income per 
capita, ln GDPpc and the proportion of social housing in the province, Shousing. Also the 
lagged user cost will be included as instrument. For choosing the set of instruments 
and providing evidence of their validity, the Hansen J statistic (as overidentification test) 
is computed with satisfactory results in both cases.23 Note that in general the strategy 
of including as instruments the lagged dependent variables of equation 5 has been avoided 
thus providing a more robust experiment. 
Following section 2 the judicial efficiency has been studied in the two stages of the 
procedure (declaratory and execution) in the form of a congestion rate. Prtcongestion and 
excongestion enter the equation lagged several periods, up to four, taking into account 
that the decision to put a dwelling into the tenancy market may take into account the “judicial 
environment” observed some periods before. This fact would also mitigate any problems 
of endogeneity of the judicial variables. In any case, there are no reasons to suspect of the 
endogeneity of the judicial variables in this research. The courts taken into account in 
this study (“juzgados de primera instancia” and “juzgados de primera instancia e instruccion”) 
are not specialized courts and solve very different types of conflicts, ranging from inheritance 
conflicts to some bankruptcy proceedings, thus the distribution of tenancy conflicts 
(generated in part by the amount of tenancy and property contracts in the province) is not 
                                                                          
22. Under the presence of heteroskedasticity GMM estimators are more efficient than the IV robust ones. 
23. Note that I did not assume homoskedasticity. Otherwise, the Sargan´s statistic would be reported. 
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necessarily influencing the distribution of “juzgados de primera instancia” and “juzgados de 
primera instancia e instrucción”). 
As a first result it is important to note that the efficiency of the declaratory stage has 
no significant impact on the share of property.24 Therefore, this paper focuses the analysis on 
the final or definitive step (execution). Nevertheless, this is an interesting result by itself as it 
will be discussed in the conclusions. 
For completeness, tables 9 and 10 show the results of the estimation of this 
alternative model (equation 6) similar to the previous one, but including the measure of simple 
relative prices (pricetorent) instead of the user cost. 
 
Prprop i,t = c + ∑ctTt  +  1 Pricetorent i,t + 2 Excongestion i,t-3+ 3 Densityi,t+ (...) 
+ (i + i,t ) (6) 
Results 
First of all it is worth noting that both the user cost (in tables 7 and 8) and the relative 
price (in tables 9 and 10) enter the equation with a positive sign. The sign confirms that 
we have estimated a supply curve once we take into account that the overidentification 
tests were passed satisfactorily. On one hand, when we include fixed effects, the effect 
of the user cost is significant and quite robust to different specifications. On the other hand, 
when we take first differences, the results for the variables are generally not significant. 
However, the sign keeps on being positive in the majority of cases. Also, it should be taken 
into account that taking first differences has a high cost in terms of estimation in the case 
of this panel. Note that the T is very short and therefore an important part of heterogeneity is 
lost when we loose one year in the estimations. 
The variable density has the expected (negative) sign in all the cases. When we 
include fixed effects the variable is significant at 1% level and the results are quite robust 
to the different specifications. When we take first differences, the significance reduces to 5% 
and keeps the negative sign. 
Finally, looking at the results for the judicial variables, we find the expected effects. 
First of all, it is found that a higher congestion or pendency rates have positive effects in 
the share of houses in the property market (by definition, in the case of the resolution rate the 
effect is the opposite). That is, a lower efficiency of the judicial system attracts more houses 
to the property market. That is to say that a “problematic” tenancy market prevents the 
owners/landlords to put their dwellings into the tenancy market. 
Table 7 shows that an increase in one point in the congestion rate would increase, 
the share of property in around 0.14-0.21 percentage points. Thus, taking the example 
of Madrid, the decrease in the congestion rate would attract to the rental market an 
amount of around 3200-4800 dwellings. Those results are significant at around 5% or 1% 
respectively. 
                                                                          
24. The estimations are available on demand. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA   22   DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1025 
 
5 Conclusions 
This research presents some estimations of the effect of the efficiency of the judicial system 
on the proportion of property in the Spanish provinces. The problem is analyzed 
econometrically through panel data techniques. Specifically, the generalized method of 
moments (2-step GMM) is used in the estimations as several instrumental variables are taken 
into account. This study is the first one in the economic literature tackling the case of Spain at 
the local level. 
The judicial efficiency is measured through the construction of a “congestion” 
indicator in two stages of the procedure: the declaratory stage and its final executory stage. 
First of all, this research does not find any significant impact of the efficiency in the 
declaratory stage on the housing property share. However, this research concludes that an 
increase in the judicial efficiency in the execution stage would have a positive, although minor, 
impact on the share of property in the Spanish provinces. The effect amounts from 0.1 to 0.2 
percentage points of the housing market (higher effects are found if other efficiency measures 
are taken into account) (see annex A). That effect would be denoting that homeowners avoid 
the tenancy market when they cannot enforce their contracts. 
The discussions presented in this research give some ground to improve the 
efficiency of the judicial system, at least in the execution stage, as a way to develop 
the Spanish tenancy market. 
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ANNEX A: Estimations with alternative judicial efficiency measures 
Judicial efficiency can be measured in different ways. This research has opted to study 
the “congestion rate”, even though other efficiency measures could be computed using the 
same database. 
This annex offers the results of the study if two alternative efficiency measures are 
taken into account: the “resolution rate” and the “pending cases rate”. The resolution rate is 
defined as the ratio between the cases resolved and the cases that entered the system 
for a specific year and for a type of procedure. The pending cases rate is defined as the 
ratio between pending cases in a specific year and the cases resolved in the same period 

















,   (7) 
Higher resolution rate or lower pending cases rate are related to greater efficiency 
of the judicial system. 
As before, those measures are calculated for both stages of the procedures 
(declaratory and executory) The prefix “prt” precedes the efficiency measures related to 
procedures in the “declaratory stage” (or as we called it, “first” procedures): prtresolution 
and prtpendency (in the tables). The prefix “ex” precedes the type of efficiency measures 
related to the executions: exresolution and expendency (in the tables). Some summary 
statistics are included in table 1. 
With respect to the first measure of efficiency related to executions, exresolution, 
the following can be said: on average the judicial system was able to solve nearly the same 
amount of cases that were entering the courts (resolution rate of 0.87). This does not imply a 
constant workload because some conflicts may be waiting in the pile at the beginning of 
the year (this aspect is better analyzed with more complete measures of efficiency as the 
pendency cases rate and the congestion rate). Even though some provinces underperformed 
quite radically (minimum of 0.42), others were able to solve two times more cases than 
the number of new cases entering the system, and thus were able to reduce the workload 
for future periods. Graph 3 represents the resolution rate in the Spanish provinces in 2001 
and 2007. As it can be seen in the graph, the resolution rate diminished all over Spain 
(thus, the efficiency of the system diminished over time). 
On average (see table 1), almost three times more cases were pending (waiting to be 
solved) with respect to the cases that the courts were able to solve. As before, although 
some provinces had, on average, very good results (pendency rate of 0.46), other provinces 
had more than seven times more cases waiting to be solved than the average workload they 
were able to solve in a year. Graph 4 represents the pendency rate in 2001 and 2007. 
The rate grew over the period denoting a reduction in the efficiency of the system. 
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As it happened with the case of congestion, no significant results are found when 
the models are computed taking into account the efficiency in the “declaratory” stage. 
Table 11 shows the results of the estimations when we consider the pendency cases 
rate instead of the congestion rate as a measure of efficiency. The results are consistent with 
the previous ones. An increase of the pendency rate in one point would increase the property 
share of the province in around 0.17-0.27 percentage points (around 3900-6200 houses in 
Madrid). The results are significant at 5% level. In the case of estimating equation 6, the effect 
of the pendency rate would be around 0.15 percentage points (see table 12). Tables 13 and 
14 show the results when first differences (FD) are taken. 
Finally, an increase in one point of the resolution rate (see Table 15) implies a 
reduction in the property rate of around 0.69 percentage points (that would be approximately 
15000 houses passing from the property market to the tenancy market and related options in 
Madrid). However, the effect is not always significant in the case of the resolution rate. In the 
case of estimating equation 6, the effect of the resolution rate would be around 0.55 
percentage points (table 16). Tables 17 and 18 show the results when first differences (FD) 
are taken. 
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ANNEX B: Theoretical background 
To integrate all the reasonings offered in this paper, it seems useful to discuss how agents 
(on the demand or supply side of the market) behave in theoretical terms when they are 
confronted to the housing tenure choice. Moreover, it is useful to add to that theoretical 
background how those agents react when they are confronted to an inefficient judicial 
system. 
Henderson and Ioannides (1983) offer a useful model for this issue as they study the 
behavior of both owner-occupiers and renters through their decisions to consume and invest 
in housing services. If the investment demand for housing is large enough relative to 
consumption demand, the individual will own a dwelling and will rent part of the free space in 
the housing market. Thus, he will be a landlord offering housing services. On the contrary, 
if the consumption demand is larger than the investment demand, the individual will opt for 
renting and will not own a house (we will observe him as a tenant consuming housing services 
but not investing). 
In the model, the housing consumption demand will depend on several factors such 
as wealth, the income path or financial restrictions. For instance, an individual confronted 
to less wealth at the beginning of his lifetime will be a tenant if he is also confronted to 
financial restrictions. 
It is even more relevant to observe how the investment side works. If the profitability 
of investing in housing diminishes, less “space” will be offered in the market (the number of 
“landlords” will diminish in the economy). In fact, the profitability of the investment in housing 
services is affected by several factors such as maintenance costs, taxation or depreciation. 
This paper studies the effects on the market of a very specific transaction cost: the judicial 
inefficiency that will affect exclusively the landlords. 
Following Henderson and Ioannides (1983) the individuals maximize the following 
multi-period utility function. 
 
)())(,( wVhufxU c   
 
Where U stands for the utility obtained from the consumption bundle and V (w) 
stands for the indirect utility function of wealth remaining after period 1. The services obtained 
from a house (as a durable good) are determined by u (the rate of utilization) and hc 
(the capacity).  X stands for the consumption in period 1 of the numeraire. 












BANCO DE ESPAÑA   26   DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1025 
 
Where T(u) is the utilization cost function, Y represents income, P is the market 
purchase price of a unit of housing stock, S is savings and r is the rate of interest. 












Where R stands for the rental price of housing and  (u) is the tenant cost function. 
To introduce the judicial inefficiency (J) in the model of Henderson and Ioannides 
(1983) I could model the utilization cost function of the dwelling as: 
2)( JuuT   
J will increase the transaction costs for the landlord. Three different ways to measure 
J are explained in section 2 and annex A. In any case, the judicial inefficiency (J) will take 
always positive values. α is a parameter and u is the rate of utilization. As required, T(u) is a 
convex function: T’(u)>0 and T’’(u)>0. 
On the other hand, the tenant cost function could take the following simple form 
that is not depending on the judicial efficiency: 
2)( uu   
Where  (u) is also a convex function. ’(u)>0 and ’’(u)>0. 
With those two cost functions, the equilibrium condition of the Henderson-Ioannides 
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Thus, following that derivation, in equilibrium the rate of utilization will depend 
negatively on the judicial inefficiency. As it was already said, judicial inefficiency can be 




 PRrJfu  
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Even though we consider J and r as exogenous variables affecting the equilibrium, 
R and P (together with the quantity of housing services in the market) are defined within the 
model. Therefore, in an econometric implementation they should be treated as endogenous 
and thus they must be instrumented. For instance, an exogenous shock increasing the 
judicial inefficiency will affect the equilibrium price and quantity of housing services through a 
shift in the supply side (or investment) of housing services but not through the demand curve 
as defined before. Thus, in the case of estimating econometrically the supply curve we will 
have to instrument the price (or the user cost) using for instance strictly “demand” instruments 
(that is, demand shifters which are not affecting the supply). 
Theoretically, Henderson and Ioannides (1983) provide a discussion on some 
important factors affecting the equilibrium mainly thorough the demand side of housing 
services (that is, those who actually rent their consumption of housing services). In their 
model, higher wealth individuals will be renters, even though that is not the general finding 
in the empirical literature (see section 3) and the result is found without taking into account life 
cycle considerations. The issue of the life cycle is partly taken into account in this paper 
through the use of the proportion of “young population” as instrument in the econometric 
model. 
Capital market imperfections also play a role in the Henderson and Ioannides model 
and are taken into account in this paper (although through a very imperfect measure). 
Following the theoretical model, those with a high wealth in the future but a low wealth in 
the present will opt for renting rather than for owning. That can be understood as a result 
of the difficulties that the agents face when they try to smooth consumption and investment 
through time if there are capital market imperfections. 
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Table 1: Judicial system variables 
Source: CGPJ (2009) and self elaboration. 
Type of procedure Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Declaratory Prtcongestion 350 1.53 0.36 1.03 4.17
Declaratory Prtresolution 350 0.92 0.14 0.39 1.18
Declaratory Prtpendency 350 0.41 0.16 0.13 1.59
Execution Excongestion 350 3.97 1.20 1.20 9.99
Execution Exresolution 350 0.87 0.20 0.42 2.02
Execution Expendency 350 2.77 0.98 0.46 7.59


















Source: Self elaboration from CGPJ (2009) data. 
Table 2: Judicial congestion rate by province (execution) 
province 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Álava 1.20 1.88 1.25 2.62 4.28 1.23 2.28
Albacete 3.81 3.00 4.78 3.01 2.95 2.46 3.49
Alicante 3.77 4.68 6.01 4.46 5.72 6.23 5.64
Almería 3.08 4.38 3.92 4.14 3.54 3.60 4.11
Ávila 2.52 1.85 3.48 2.95 4.19 5.64 3.74
Badajoz 3.30 3.76 3.25 3.28 3.81 3.95 4.52
Baleares 3.44 3.30 4.94 6.70 6.36 8.99 9.47
Barcelona 4.07 4.80 5.34 4.79 4.76 4.99 4.98
Burgos 2.31 3.28 3.14 2.79 3.36 3.16 2.95
Cáceres 3.92 5.93 3.41 4.62 3.31 3.28 4.32
Cádiz 3.55 3.29 3.71 3.99 3.08 4.89 3.91
Castellón 4.72 5.50 9.99 5.33 5.40 6.42 5.95
Ciudad Real 3.62 5.50 6.89 4.11 5.02 5.02 5.30
Córdoba 2.13 3.08 3.52 4.92 3.69 3.15 2.79
A Coruña 3.56 3.96 3.24 3.70 4.27 4.39 4.60
Cuenca 2.99 4.81 4.11 4.26 5.48 5.56 4.84
Girona 2.87 4.33 3.77 4.24 4.23 4.70 5.30
Granada 2.62 3.07 3.48 4.04 3.81 5.94 4.53
Guadalajara 6.14 3.99 4.58 5.20 2.80 4.43 5.78
Guipúzcoa 2.12 1.94 1.65 2.00 2.52 2.68 2.39
Huelva 2.89 3.51 2.76 3.52 3.92 4.82 3.79
Huesca 2.69 3.88 4.31 2.90 2.97 3.27 3.93
Jaén 2.54 2.47 3.63 3.45 3.37 3.32 3.16
León 3.46 3.98 4.88 3.49 4.36 3.18 5.54
Lleida 4.52 4.31 5.01 4.13 4.47 4.50 5.30
La Rioja 2.75 2.32 2.93 3.99 3.95 3.15 3.43
Lugo 2.83 2.75 2.57 2.51 2.89 3.67 4.30
Madrid 3.83 4.66 5.22 5.23 4.89 5.74 5.53
Málaga 3.04 3.45 3.30 3.89 4.05 3.98 4.07
Murcia 5.34 4.88 4.53 4.83 5.32 5.39 4.78
Navarra 2.87 4.67 3.84 3.99 4.56 5.16 4.06
Ourense 3.92 2.91 3.16 3.43 4.04 4.47 4.86
Asturias 4.05 3.90 4.26 3.91 4.31 4.01 4.14
Palencia 2.88 3.27 2.58 4.40 4.58 3.08 4.13
Las Palmas 3.07 4.56 6.16 4.61 5.13 5.16 4.89
Pontevedra 2.72 3.25 3.19 3.46 3.86 5.23 4.11
Salamanca 2.16 3.42 2.55 2.90 2.32 3.35 3.04
uz Tenerife 2.91 3.03 4.65 4.51 5.55 5.17 4.99
Cantabria 2.85 2.89 3.44 3.45 4.05 3.84 3.15
Segovia 2.51 2.68 3.20 3.08 2.54 3.85 3.96
Sevilla 2.83 3.25 3.81 3.58 3.33 4.23 5.17
Soria 4.42 2.62 3.84 1.90 2.32 3.43 2.96
Tarragona 4.22 4.62 4.64 4.69 3.81 4.88 4.75
Teruel 3.25 6.07 5.56 5.41 5.17 6.11 4.75
Toledo 4.38 3.98 4.48 4.77 4.40 5.27 3.88
Valencia 5.23 5.71 6.12 5.29 5.64 6.39 6.13
Valladolid 1.30 4.28 2.10 4.03 3.86 4.07 3.72
Vizcaya 1.76 1.80 2.69 1.91 2.83 2.64 2.21
Zamora 3.62 3.58 3.22 2.77 2.76 3.75 3.93
Zaragoza 2.98 4.70 4.84 3.52 4.18 5.05 5.20
Santa Cruz d  Tenerife




Table 3: Dependent variable and controls  
Source: Self elaboration. Data for Ceuta and Melilla is not included in this table. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Sources
Prpr 350 0.8865862 0.0358094 0.773687 0.9558229 MVIV
Ln GDPpc 350 9.692512 0.1878638 9.2653 10.18491 INE (Regional accounts)
Usercost 300 -13.42913 16.34021 -67.84351 31.59234 Banco de España, INE, MVIV
Pricetorent 350 345.9964 93.57316 150.9641 642.566 INE, MVIV
Density 350 118.3864 152.3166 8.801572 761.345 INE (Padrón)
Ppob2039 350 31.22394 2.680948 25.05463 38.30739 INE (Padrón)
Credit 300 314.9468 24621.52 -33022.94 124393.2 Banco de España, INE





Table 4: Share of property in the Spanish 
Source: Ministry of Housing of Spain (2009) and self elaboration 
Province 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Álava 91.65 91.27 90.61 90.22 89.73 89.31 88.63
Albacete 88.47 89.59 90.48 91.25 92.06 92.82 92.82
Alicante 89.04 89.50 89.98 90.41 90.86 91.36 91.36
Almería 85.60 86.26 87.13 88.19 88.97 89.79 89.79
Ávila 90.61 91.28 91.91 92.58 93.22 93.84 93.84
Badajoz 86.17 87.09 87.83 88.48 89.14 89.74 89.74
Baleares 77.37 78.41 79.76 81.16 82.21 82.91 82.91
Barcelona 80.88 80.42 80.12 80.14 79.94 79.91 79.91
Burgos 89.29 89.01 88.91 88.79 88.89 88.76 88.76
Cáceres 85.47 86.30 87.41 88.20 89.06 89.82 89.82
Cádiz 83.27 83.43 83.85 84.44 84.91 85.22 85.22
Castellón 89.01 90.17 91.20 92.29 93.27 94.44 94.44
Ciudad Real 89.68 90.15 90.71 91.08 91.62 92.59 91.95
Córdoba 88.73 89.27 89.83 90.35 91.10 91.67 91.67
A Coruña 84.79 85.46 86.18 87.05 87.69 88.20 88.20
Cuenca 91.32 90.66 89.97 89.33 88.86 88.29 88.29
Girona 82.46 81.95 81.55 80.33 79.45 78.85 78.85
Granada 86.43 87.42 87.99 88.74 89.54 90.05 90.05
Guadalajara 90.60 91.08 91.40 91.91 92.36 92.75 92.75
Guipúzcoa 90.12 89.55 88.90 88.36 88.12 87.58 87.58
Huelva 87.46 88.16 89.11 89.90 90.51 91.19 91.19
Huesca 88.49 88.47 88.30 88.21 87.88 87.33 87.33
Jaén 89.20 89.98 90.84 91.60 92.49 93.25 93.25
León 85.39 86.14 86.71 87.27 87.78 88.38 88.38
Lleida 85.78 87.52 89.03 90.34 91.58 92.71 92.71
La Rioja 88.78 89.52 90.40 90.97 91.38 91.99 91.99
Lugo 90.69 91.85 92.78 93.74 94.66 95.58 95.58
Madrid 84.49 84.24 83.91 83.62 83.13 83.37 83.06
Málaga 86.25 86.09 85.77 85.73 85.69 87.24 85.53
Murcia 88.01 88.67 89.30 90.10 90.81 91.54 91.54
Navarra 90.14 90.67 91.42 92.08 92.66 93.17 93.17
Ourense 90.03 89.20 88.61 87.78 87.16 86.51 86.50
Asturias 84.49 85.08 85.46 85.92 86.25 86.71 86.71
Palencia 88.78 89.36 89.89 90.55 91.33 91.95 91.93
Las Palmas 78.30 78.96 80.02 80.58 80.75 81.47 81.47
Pontevedra 85.94 85.58 85.48 85.89 86.20 85.87 86.19
Salamanca 88.85 89.30 89.73 90.30 90.85 91.33 91.33
Santa Cruz de Tenerife 81.45 82.08 82.90 83.34 83.86 84.58 84.58
Cantabria 88.90 89.29 89.85 90.29 90.98 91.36 91.36
Segovia 87.75 87.96 87.86 87.97 87.69 87.96 87.96
Sevilla 89.08 89.05 88.81 88.48 88.35 88.66 88.04
Soria 89.48 90.74 92.04 93.24 94.35 95.36 95.36
Tarragona 86.06 87.05 87.93 88.87 89.41 90.22 90.22
Teruel 89.35 90.25 91.14 92.20 93.18 94.00 94.00
Toledo 90.02 90.55 91.23 91.83 92.31 92.79 92.79
Valencia 89.79 90.16 90.44 90.68 90.93 91.21 91.21
Valladolid 88.56 89.22 89.64 90.02 90.46 90.90 90.90
Vizcaya 91.55 91.81 92.33 92.71 93.23 93.50 93.50
Zamora 90.82 91.29 91.86 92.36 92.83 93.27 93.27
Zaragoza 86.66 87.05 87.37 87.56 87.67 87.91 87.91
















Source: Banco de España (2009) 
















Autónoma) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Andalusia O,T O,T O,T O,T O,T
Aragón
Balearic Islands O O,T O,T O,T O,T
Canary Islands O,T
Cantabria O,T O,T O,T
Castile-La Mancha
Castile and León O O,T O,T
Catalonia T O,T T T T
Valencian Community O, T O,T O,T O,T O,T O,T
Extremadura O O O O,T O,T O,T
Galicia T T T T T
Madrid T T T T T
Murcia O O O O O O
Navarre F F F F F F
Basque Country F F F F F F
Asturias O,T O,T O,T O,T O,T
La Rioja O O O O O O
O: Regional Home ownership tax deduction
T: Regional House tenancy tax deduction
F: Foral Tax regime
Sources: Agencia Tributaria (Ministry of Economics of Spain) and self elaboration
Table 6: Fiscal regimes in the Spanish Autonomous Regions 
Table 7: Effects of the judicial congestion rate and the user cost (FE) 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM









Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 250 200
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0.709 0.834
Wald Test for time dummies 0 0
Dependent variable: Share of property
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: User cost































Table 8: Effects of the judicial congestion rate and the user cost (FD) 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM









Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 200 150
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0,11 0,376
Wald Test for time dummies 0.094 0.114
Dependent variable: Share of property
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: User cost




Table 9: Effects of the judicial congestion rate and the relative price (FE) 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM









Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 250 200
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0.123 0,336
Wald Test for time dummies 0 0.694
Dependent variable: Share of property
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: Pricetorent





























Table 11: Effects of the judicial pendency rate and the user cost (FE) 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM









Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 250 200
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0,729 0,810
Wald Test for time dummies 0 0
Dependent variable: Share of property
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: User cost




Table 10: Effects of the judicial congestion rate and the relative price (FD) 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM









Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 200 150
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0,283 0,237
Wald Test for time dummies 0.028 0.424
Dependent variable: Share of property
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: Pricetorent































Table 13: Effects of the judicial pendency rate and the user cost (FD) 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM









Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 200 150
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0,146 0,379
Wald Test for time dummies 0.039 0.256
Dependent variable: Share of property
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: User cost




Table 12: Effects of the judicial pendency rate and the relative price (FE) 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM









Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 250 200
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0,134 0,349
Wald Test for time dummies 0 0.765
Dependent variable: Share of property
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: Pricetorent






























Table 14: Effects of the judicial pendency rate and the relative price (FD) 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM









Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 200 150
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0,39 0.273
Wald Test for time dummies 0.049 0.437
Dependent variable: Share of property
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: Pricetorent




Table 15: Effects of the judicial resolution rate and the user cost (FE) 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM









Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 250 200
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0,727 0,803
Wald Test for time dummies 0 0
Dependent variable: Share of property
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: User cost































Table 16: Effects of the judicial resolution rate and the relative price (FE) 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM









Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 250 200
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0,121 0,217
Wald Test for time dummies 0 0.267
Dependent variable: Share of property
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: Pricetorent




Table 17: Effects of the judicial resolution rate and the user cost (FD) 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM









Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 200 150
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0,121 0,282
Wald Test for time dummies 0.752 0.206
Dependent variable: Share of property
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: User cost


















Table 18: Effects of the judicial resolution rate and the relative price (FD) 
Model 1 2
Method of estimation 2-Step GMM 2-Step GMM









Time effects Yes Yes
Observations 200 150
Groups/Clusters 50 50
Hansen J statistic (P-value) 0.291 0.192
Wald Test for time dummies 0.267 0.284
Dependent variable: Share of property
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation beneath coefficients 
Instrumented: Pricetorent
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